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INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of state and local selective purchasing laws
was placed in jeopardy on November 4, 1998. On this date, the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
249
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struck down the Burma Law,' a 1996 Massachusetts govern-
ment procurement statute that bans goods and services con-
tracts between Massachusetts and those doing business with, or
in, the Union of Myanmar (formerly Burma).2 Massachusetts
enacted the statute in response to ongoing atrocities committed
by Myanmar's government, a military regime known as the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).3 Challenged in
National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, the law was invali-
dated because it impermissibly infringed on the federal govern-
ment's power to regulate foreign affairs.4
The Baker decision could have a serious effect on other state
and local laws that attempt to make similar statements about
world issues. The Burma Law raises the question of whether
state and local governments have the right to choose the nations
with whom they do business, as well as whether they have any
right to make statements about foreign policy. Given the tradi-
tion of exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs and for-
eign commerce, the weight of precedent and history lies against
the law. Nevertheless, the important human rights issues at the
heart of the Burma Law, as well as the intriguing constitutional
issues and powerful economic interests involved, will ensure the
fight over the Burma Law's legitimacy will continue regardless
of its recent setback in federal court.5
1. Act of June 25, 1996, Chapter 10, 1, 1996 Mass Acts 210, codified at
MASS. GEN. LAws, ch. 7, §§ 22(G)-22(M) [hereinafter Burma Law].
2. In 1997 the country formerly known as Burma changed its name to
Myanmar.
3. The military regime was known previously as the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, or SLORC. See Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and Local
Free Burma Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade, 29 LAw & POL'Y INTL Bus.
257 (1998) (citing Burmese Junta Announces Name Change, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Nov. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, New Library, ASISAPC DPA
File).
4. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 289
(D. Mass. 1998). For discussion of the NFTC's position, see Sarah Jackson-Han,
Trade Group Sues U.S. State over Myanmar Sanctions Law, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2272315; Lane Lambert, Compa-
nies Ask Court to Block Local Sanctions Against Burma, PATRIOT LEDGER, Sept.
23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8085904.
5. See, e.g., Fred Bayles, Burma Law in Massachusetts Ruled Unconstitu-
tional: Local Governments' Rights to Enact Foreign-Policy Laws at Issue, USA
TODAY, Nov. 6, 1998, at 3A (indicating that Burma Law supporters will rally to
fight the prospect of international corporations micromanaging state procure-
ment policies). See also Michael S. Lelyveld, Massachusetts Sanctions Struck
Down: Judges Ruling May Set Precedent for State Bans, J. COM., Nov. 6, 1998,
at 1A (discussing the prospect of Massachusetts requesting that the law remain
in force pending appeal, and the belief of legal experts that the issue may reach
the Supreme Court).
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The SPDC is notorious for its history of violence and human
rights violations. 6 In 1989, the SPDC placed National League
for Democracy (NLD) leader and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and later refused to rec-
ognize the NLD's landslide victory in Myanmar's 1990 mul-
tiparty elections.7 Over the course of its rule, the SPDC has
arrested over one thousand protestors who are often subjected to
torture and solitary confinement, tried without legal counsel,
and sentenced to long prison terms for reasons as vague as writ-
ing material that the government found "unacceptable."8 More-
over, the SPDC is known to use slave labor,9 engage in heroin
and opium smuggling, foster prostitution,1 ° and force villagers
to act as human mine-sweepers. 11 The SPDC has thus far re-
fused to recognize the NLD's 1990 multiparty election victory,
and tensions have recently mounted due to the NLD's establish-
ment of a committee purporting to perform the functions of a
parliament.' 2 The committee has declared all laws enacted by
the SPDC since 1988 to be without legal basis or authority.' 3
State and local responses to the SPDC's atrocities have em-
broiled the United States in a controversy over the appropriate-
ness of legal action by individual states and localities in
response to Burmese politics.' 4 During the 1980s, state and lo-
cal governments took unilateral action against South Africa be-
cause of its apartheid policies, but no challenge to those laws
6. See Gregory J. Wallance, Caremark and the Globalization of Good Cor-
porate Conduct, in CORP. COMPLIANCE, June-July 1998, at 1209 (PLI Corp. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. BO-001E, 1998).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Prohibiting New Investment in Burma, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.
750 (May 20, 1997).
10. See Wallance, supra note 6, at 1209.
11. See Theo Emery, Burma Infant's Cries Resonate; A World Away, Young
Lawyer Uses US Legal System to Battle Human-Rights Abuses, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 3, 1997, at B1.
12. See Myanmar Raps "Interference" in Democracy Issues, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1998 (noting the SPDC's refusal to recognize the NLD's vic-
tory and describing the NLD's new committee).
13. See id.
14. For analysis of laws dealing with Myanmar, see generally David
Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local En-
actments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (My-
anmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997); Daniel M. Price & John P.
Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39
HARV. INT'L L. J. 443 (1998); Carvajal, supra note 3.
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reached federal court.15 Citing policy disagreements with the
federal government, numerous cities and states have now
passed, or are planning to pass, laws banning trade with some
foreign countries and prohibiting government contracts with
those who do business with them.' 6 Such laws prompt debate
over their constitutionality' 7 and conformity with World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements.18 As demonstrated by Baker,
selective procurement laws in 43 states and in many localities
are in jeopardy.' 9
Critics of the Burma Law and similar statutes argue that
such laws are susceptible to constitutional challenge on three
grounds. First, they are preempted by federal law; second, they
interfere with the authority of the federal government to con-
duct international relations; and third, they interfere with Con-
gress' authority to regulate foreign commerce. 20 Proponents
counter that the Burma Law is not preempted by federal legisla-
tion because it has the same goals as a comparable federal law
and Congress has not expressed an intent to preempt the Burma
15. See Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 446 (recognizing that no federal
court has ruled on this issue). For further discussion of the constitutionality of
state and local laws aimed at foreign countries, including anti-apartheid laws
aimed at South Africa, see generally Richard Bilder, The Role of Cities and
States in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1989); Howard N. Fenton
III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy
Trade Restrictions, 13 N.W. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 563 (1993); Eduardo E. Neret &
Marcio W. Valladares, Comment, The Florida International Affairs Act: A
Model for State Activism in Foreign Affairs, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197
(1992); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Evelyn Iritani, Coalition Challenges Myanmar Trade Ban
Courts: Suit Has Direct Implications for Similar Laws in California Cities, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 1998, at D1 (recognizing that Santa Monica, San Francisco,
Berkeley and Oakland have similar laws targeting Myanmar and that Los An-
geles is considering one, as well). See also Kimberly Music, Local, State Sanc-
tions Get Industry's Attention, OIL DAILY, Mar. 2, 1998, at 1 (noting that
Maryland, New York, Vermont, and Minneapolis have introduced measures to
sanction Myanmar).
17. See generally Carvajal, supra note 3; Schmahmann & Finch, supra note
14; Price & Hannah, supra note 14 (discussing the constitutionality of state and
local government procurement laws).
18. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14 (arguing that WTO
agreements are violated). See also Japan Protests Massachusetts Law, MASs.
LAWYER'S WKLY., Feb. 10, 1997, at 31 (describing Japan's claim that the Burma
Law violates WTO agreement provisions).
19. See Bayles, supra note 5, at 3A (stating the opinion of legal experts as
to the status of such laws).
20. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14, at 183; Price & Hannah,
supra note 14, at 454-55.
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Law.21 Proponents further argue that the Burma Law does not
impermissibly interfere with the federal government's ability to
conduct foreign affairs because its actual effect is incidental.
22
Finally, proponents point to the rights of states as market par-
ticipants, as well as the spirit of the First Amendment, to sup-
port the contention that states should be able to spend their
money as they choose. 23
This Note will discuss the legality of state and local laws
that target foreign countries because of their governments' poli-
cies, focusing on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' 1996
Burma Law24 and its recent invalidation in Baker. Part I in-
troduces the Massachusetts Burma Law as well as a federal law
banning all new investment with Myanmar.25 Part II addresses
criticism of the Burma Law and various grounds adduced for its
invalidation. Part III discusses precedent relevant to the Burma
Law and presents the most viable arguments in favor of its con-
stitutionality-in particular, the argument that states have the
right as market participants to decide how they will spend their
own funds. This Note concludes that although the Burma Law's
legitimacy is tenuous, it stands a credible chance of being upheld
on appeal.26
I. THE BURMA LAW AND FEDERAL SANCTIONS
A. THE BURMA LAw
Massachusetts was the first state to pass a selective
purchasing law that targets Myanmar. 27 The law prohibits the
21. See Neret & Valladares, supra note 15, at 216 n.165 (making a parallel
argument regarding South African anti-apartheid laws and Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986).
22. See, e.g., Myanmar Official Downplays U.S. Business Restrictions, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 10, 1997 (quoting a statement by Myanmar's minister
for national planning and economic development that selective purchasing laws
"will only hurt the United States companies but will not affect Myanmar
much.").
23. See Bilder, supra note 15, at 829 (discussing the possibility that free-
dom of speech and petition rights of state and local governments are
implicated).
24. Burma Law, supra note 1.
25. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166, 3009-167.
26. See U.S. Group Files Suit To Keep Contacts Open With Myanmar,
AsIAN WALL ST. J., May 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL-WSJA 3475381 (noting
that NFTC President Frank Kittredge indicated the NFTC will litigate the case
all the way to the Supreme Court if need be).
27. See Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 449. Indeed, in 1982 the state
legislature passed an anti-apartheid divestment law that required the state to
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its agents from procuring
goods or services from anyone whose name appears on a re-
stricted purchase list composed of individuals or entities found
to be "doing business with Burma (Myanmar)."28 The Burma
Law defines "doing business with Burma (Myanmar)" as being
incorporated or having one's principal place of business in My-
anmar, providing goods or services to its government, or promot-
ing the importation or sale of products, the trade of which is
largely controlled by the Myanmar government. 29 The Massa-
chusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance maintains the
restricted purchase list 30 and disseminates it to all state agen-
cies and state authorities.31
withdraw, over three years, all public pension funds from companies that did
business in South Africa. See Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in
South Africa: The Lifting of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and
the Continuing Validity of State and Local Anti-Apartheid Legislation, 6 CoNN.
J. INT'L L. 7, 13 (1990). Many believe that such laws, popular in the 1980s, were
instrumental in pressuring South Africa to end apartheid. See id. at 8. More
recently, Massachusetts proposed legislation penalizing companies that do
business with Indonesia, prompting renewed criticism from opponents of the
Burma Law. See, e.g., David R. Schmahmann, et al., Off the Precipice: Massa-
chusetts Expands its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021 (1997).
28. See Burma Law, supra note 1, at § 22(H)&( J). The Burma Law applies
only to contracts entered into after the effective date of the act. See id at
§ 22(J).
29. "Doing business with Burma (Myanmar)" is defined as:
(a) having a principal place of business, place or incorporation or its
corporate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any opera-
tions, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution
agreements, or any other similar agreements in Burma (Myanmar), or
being the majority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such a
person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma, including
providing direct loans, underwriting government securities, providing
any consulting advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, act-
ing as a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursu-
ant to a contractual agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other
related products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the gov-
ernment of Burma (Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma
(Myanmar).
Id. at § 22(G).
30. See id. at § 22(J)(a)-(c) (stating that the list is maintained by secretary
of the Operational Services Division of the Executive Office of Administration
and Finance, who, during compilation, consults "United Nations reports, re-
sources of the Investor Responsibility Research Center and the Associates to
Develop Democratic Burma, and other reliable sources," with updates at least
once every three months).
31. See id. at § 22(J)(d).
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When soliciting contract bids, state agencies or state au-
thorities must give bidders advance notice of the law's require-
ments.32 Before bids are reviewed, or before the contract is
awarded, the awarding authority must obtain a statement from
an authorized representative of the bidder or offeror which
states the "nature and extent to which said person is engaging
in activities which would subject said person to inclusion on the
restricted purchase list. '3 3 At that point, if the "person" is on
the list, that "person" may only be awarded the contract if the
awarding authority certifies in writing to the secretary or chief
operating officer that (1) the procurement is essential and com-
pliance with the statute "would eliminate the only bid or offer, or
would result in inadequate competition;" 34 or (2) the Common-
wealth is purchasing certain medical supplies; 35 or (3) there is
no comparable low bid or offer by an individual not on the re-
stricted list.36
B. THE FEDERAL LAW
After Massachusetts passed the Burma Law, Congress en-
acted the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
which issued federal sanctions against Myanmar. 37 This legis-
lation prohibits all aid to Burma except humanitarian assist-
ance,38  counter-narcotics assistance, 39  and "assistance
promoting human rights and democratic values."40 In addition,
the legislation orders the Executive Branch to vote against aid
to Myanmar in international financial institutions, 41 prohibits
the granting of entry visas to any Myanmar official, 42 and ap-
peals to the President, along with Myanmar's neighbors and
other major trading partners, to develop a multilateral strategy
32. See id. at § 22(H)(c).
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 22(H)(b)(1)-(4).
35. See id. at § 22(I). This section provides that "a state agency may
purchase medical supplies intended to preserve or prolong life or to cure, pre-
vent, or ameliorate diseases, including hospital, nutritional, diagnostic, phar-
maceutical and non-prescription products specifically manufactured to satisfy
identified health care needs, or for which there is no medical substitute." Id.
36. See id. at § 22(H)(d). A "comparable low bid" is one that is up to 10%
higher than one made by one on the restricted purchase list. Id.
37. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, supra note 25, at
§ 570.
38. See id. at § 570(a)(1)(A).
39. See id. at § 570(a)(1)(B).
40. Id. at § 570(a)(1)(C).
41. See id. at § 570(a)(2).
42. See id. at § 570(a)(3).
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to foster democracy and end violations of human rights in My-
anmar.43 Finally, if the President finds, subsequent to the en-
actment of the law, that the situation in Myanmar has not
improved, he or she is authorized to prohibit all new investment
in Myanmar. 44 On May 20, 1997, President Clinton invoked
this provision after determining that the government of My-
anmar had indeed continued its repressive policies. The Presi-
dent issued an executive order declaring a national emergency
and prohibiting new investment in Burma. 45 Regardless of
whether the federal sanctions are "tough" on Myanmar, their
failure to reach goods, services, and technology has caused some
critics to argue that they are unlikely to have much effect. 46
C. ALLEGED WTO VIOLATIONS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
intended to improve international economic welfare by barring
protectionist trade barriers with binding legal obligations. 47 In
1997, Japan48 and the European Community (EC) 49 called for
WTO Consultations, claiming that the Massachusetts Burma
Law violated the WTO's Agreement on Government Procure-
ment (AGP).50 The Consultations did not resolve the conflict,
43. See id. at § 570(c).
44. See id. at § 570(b).
45. See Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (1997) (prohibiting U.S.
persons from engaging in new investments in Burma, and foreign persons from
approving or facilitating a transaction which would constitute new investment
in Myanmar). Most contracts to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology
are excluded unless they include payment in either shares of ownership or in
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits, in "the economic development of
resources located in Burma." Id. at § 3(b)(i) & (ii).
46. See, e.g., James Finch, U.S. Sanctions Against Myanmar: Are There Vi-
able Alternatives?, 19 E. ASiAN ExEcUTIvE REP. 9, 14 n.2 (Feb. 15, 1997) (recog-
nizing the argument).
47. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regula-
tory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1401, 1418 (1994).
48. See Request for Consultations by Japan: United States-Measure Af-
fecting Government Procurement, July 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 448380
(W.T.O.).
49. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities: United
States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement, June 26, 1997, available
in 1997 WL378858 (W.T.O.).
50. WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 14 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 26, at 1098 (June 25, 1997) [hereinafter AGP].
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however, and Japan and the EC both filed requests for a dispute
settlement panel.51
Japan and the EU argue that the Burma Law violates Arti-
cles III, VIII(b), and XIII of the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement, primarily because, in practice, the law imposes a
10% price increase on contract bids if a bidding company does
business with, or in, Myanmar.5 2 Japan and the EU allege a
violation of Article III because suppliers on the restricted
purchase list are not accorded "no less favorable treatment"
than that accorded to suppliers not on the list. They also contend
that the Burma Law violates Article III because of the possibil-
ity that one locally established supplier could be treated "less
favorably" than another solely on the basis of which country pro-
duces the goods or services supplied, or on the degree of foreign
affiliation or ownership of the supplier.5 3 Japan and the EU fur-
ther claim that the Burma Law similarly violates Article VIII(b)
because it imposes conditions on a tendering company which are
not essential to ensure the firm's ability to fulfill the contract.
Finally, they allege that the Burma Law is in conflict with Arti-
cle XIII because it prohibits an award of any contract to tender-
ers whose offer is the lowest, except under criteria which violate
the AGP.5 4
Despite the forceful arguments against the validity of the
Burma Law, there is a chance it will survive WTO scrutiny5 5 if
the U.S. government supports it. When a dispute settlement
panel finds a state law to violate the AGP, the law is not auto-
51. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, United States-
Measure Affecting Government Procurement, Sept. 9, 1998, available in 1998
WL 634585 (W.T.O.); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities: United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement,
Sept. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 634585 (W.T.O.). The United States
delayed the panel by moving to block the requests, but the panel will be set up if
another request for dispute settlement is made. See Lambert, supra note 4.
52. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, United States-
Measure Affecting Government Procurement supra note 51; Request for the Es-
tablishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States-Measure
Affecting Government Procurement supra note 51.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the Inter-
national Trade System Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 967, 1006-07 (1996) (stating that the "working provisions [of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)] read more like an oratory wish
list than a binding set of regulations."). See also Charles Tiefer, Free Trade
Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 67-68 (1998)
(describing the difficult process of challenging state procurement laws).
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matically invalidated.5 6 The U.S. Trade Representative will
first meet with the state to attempt a "mutually agreeable re-
sponse to the report of the panel."57 If the Trade Representative
and the state cannot reach an agreement, the U.S. Attorney
General may challenge the law in federal court.58 It should be
noted, however, that in this forum the federal government has
the burden of proof and the panel ruling receives no deference
and is not binding precedent.5 9
Finally, if the U.S. favors a state law found to violate the
AGP, it can withdraw from the WTO after six months notice.60
However, this will probably not be necessary in this case, be-
cause the Burma Law's sponsor, Massachusetts Representative
Byron Rushing, stated that he did not know about the AGP at
the time he pushed the Burma Law through the state legislature
and that he would be willing to amend the law if the EU imposes
new sanctions on Myanmar. 61 Massachusetts officials have also
initiated meetings with U.S. officials who are attempting to "as-
sist them in crafting legislation that takes into account U.S. in-
ternational obligations." 62
56. See 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4050-54.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iv) (1998). See also Tiefer, supra note 55, at
67-68 (noting that private causes of action or defenses based on the Uruguay
Round agreements on the AGP can no longer be appealed directly in U.S. fed-
eral courts). Tiefer notes that in the implementation agreement, Congress spe-
cifically expressed an intent to preclude the only other remedy, suit in the
state's own courts. See id. at 68-69 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 2, at 16
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4028).
58. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(1998).
59. See id. at § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i)&(ii).
60. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
art. 15(1), Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROuND
VOL. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 & 1152 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment]. While Article XX of GATT authorizes a "public morals" exception that
could apply to the Burma Law, the exception rarely applies because justifica-
tion for discriminatory trade barriers must be detailed and scrutiny is rigorous.
See Farber & Hudec, supra note 47, at 1420-21.
61. See Robert S. Greenberger, Massachusetts' Law Banning Ties With My-
anmar Troubles Industry Groups and Trading Partners, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL-WSJA 3473323 (stating that Massachusetts
Representative Byron Rushing did not know about the WTO AGP at the time
he pushed the Burma Law through the state legislature, but would move to
amend it if the EU would impose new sanctions on Myanmar).
62. Evelyn Iritani, Massachusetts Law Sets Off Trade Flap Commerce:
Sanctions on Firms in Myanmar Provoke Ire in Europe and Raise Issues Over
States' Rights Versus World Trade, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at Dl (quoting a
June 5, 1997 letter by U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky to Sir
Leon Brittan, vice-president of the EC).
258 [Vol. 8:249
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Despite the pressure from Japan and the EC, the Clinton
administration has promised to defend the Burma law against
charges that it violates WTO agreements, and a spokesperson
for U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky commented
that Barshefsky will "vigorously defend the Massachusetts mea-
sure."63 Barshefsky stated that Washington will defend the
Burma law, because "[tihe practical commercial effect of this
type of legislation on Europe is nil."64
II. THE CASE AGAINST MASSACHUSETTS
The National Foreign Trade Council posed three major ar-
guments in opposition to the Burma Law before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. It argued that the
Burma Law is (1) preempted by a federal statute;65 (2) interferes
with "the federal government's exclusive power to regulate for-
eign affairs;" 66 and (3) "discriminates against and burdens inter-
national trade,"67 thus violating the Foreign Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.68 In Baker, Chief Judge Joseph Tauro in-
validated the Burma Law after determining that it interfered
with the federal government's foreign affairs power. 69 Accord-
ingly, he did not rule on either the preemption or foreign trade
arguments.70
As an important test case for the constitutionality of state
and local procurement laws, Baker was closely scrutinized.71
63. See Michael S. Lelyveld, US Vows to Defend Sanctions by State: The
Administration Will Defend the State's Myanmar Sanctions as the EU and Ja-
pan Take it to the WTO, J. COM., Sep. 11, 1998, at 3A. Furthermore, White
House sources have reported that the Clinton administration would rather
avoid a public fight with Massachusetts over the law. See Eric Altbach, USTR
To Defend Massachusetts' Burma Law, JEI Rep., No. 32, Aug. 22, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 9040487.
64. Altbach, supra note 63.
65. See id.
66. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 289 (D.
Mass. 1998).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. (stating that "the court finds that the Massachusetts Burma Law
impermissibly infringes on the federal government's power to regulate foreign
affairs.").
70. Id. at 293.
71. See, e.g., James E. Perrella, Address to the German-American Business
Council (Sept. 1, 1998), available in Vital Speeches 681, 1998 WL 141284558
(discussing why the NFTC filed the Baker case); Association's Lawsuit Chal-
lenges Massachusetts Burma Sanctions Law, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 1,
1998 (quoting NFTC President Frank Kittredge). Kittredge stated that "[w]e
regard this lawsuit to be an important test case that will determine the very
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The European Union even sent an attorney to the hearing-an
extremely unusual move for the EU. 72 Should the case continue
through the courts on appeal, the Burma Law faces an uphill
struggle. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitu-
tionality of state procurement laws affecting foreign relations,
73
and most authority supports federal supremacy in that area.
A. PREEMPTION7 4
In Baker, the NFTC argued that the federal Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997 preempts the Burma
Law.7 5 Judge Tauro, however, declined to hear arguments re-
garding preemption, 76 stating that he did not believe the NFTC
had met its burden of showing actual conflict between the
Burma Law and the Omnibus Act.77 Judge Tauro's decision
turned instead on the Burma Law's interference with the federal
government's foreign affairs power. 78 Despite Judge Tauro's si-
lence on the issue, the current state of preemption law with re-
gard to foreign affairs is not favorable to the Burma Law.
The Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United
States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land" and supersede
state laws with which they are inconsistent.7 9 Despite this,
however, preemption analysis begins with an "assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
significant, perplexing and continuing issue concerning the constitutionality of
state and local sanctions." Id.
72. See Michael S. Lelyveld, Unprecedented Intervention by EU in Bay
State, J. COM., Sept. 25, 1998, at 1A (recognizing how unusual the move was).
73. See Jackson-Han, supra note 4 (describing statement of Georgetown
University law professor Robert Sumberg that there is no decisive legal prece-
dent on state and local sanctions because none of the South Africa sanctions
laws of the 1980s ever reached the Supreme Court). See also Price & Hannah,
supra note 14, at 446 (recognizing that no federal court has ruled on this issue).
74. Although the best argument will be based on the market participant
exception, it will be discussed last in order to compare the Burma Law with the
Omnibus Act and present the relevant authority concerning federal foreign
policy power.
75. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 293 (D.
Mass. 1998).
76. Michael S. Lelyveld, Judge Hears Arguments Against Myanmar Sanc-
tions: Massachusetts Law Barring Trade With Regime Expected to Go to
Supreme Court, J. COM., Sept. 24, 1998, at 3A.
77. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d at 293 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117, 131 (1978), for the proposition that there must be actual
rather than speculative conflict).
78. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d at 289.
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress." 0
There are three major types of preemption in which such a
purpose may manifest itself. First, Congress may explicitly
state in the text of a statute that it intends to supercede state
law. 8 ' Preemption can also occur when a state law is inconsis-
tent with federal law such that compliance with the purposes
and objectives of both is impossible.8 2 A third type of preemp-
tion is commonly referred to as field preemption. This occurs
when federal regulations in a field of law are "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it,"83 or when the federal act "touch [es]
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the fed-
eral system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject."8 4 Factors considered in preemption
analysis include whether traditional state authority embraces
the state law and whether the benefits of national uniformity
outweigh the interest in allowing states and localities to make
their own decisions.8 5 Accordingly, the Burma Law could be
preempted if federal law either directly conflicts with the Burma
Law or pervasively covers the relevant field.
State and local selective purchasing laws enacted against
Myanmar have been challenged under the Supremacy Clause8 6
because they overlap and actually go beyond previously enacted
federal legislation.8 7 Proponents of this position first point out
that the federal legislation exempts contracts to sell or purchase
"goods, services, or technology,"88 while the Burma Law does
80. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
81. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973)
(holding that federal legislation preempted a local ordinance).
82. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (recognizing this type of
preemption).
83. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956) (providing an ex-
ample of field preemption).
84. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (preempting a state act
because Congress had demonstrated an intent to occupy the field of immigra-
tion law).
85. See Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analy-
sis, in FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 126, 128 (Louis Henkin et
al. eds., 1990).
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
87. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14, at 189 (stating that laws like
Massachusetts' "attempt to implement through local action a strategy expressly
considered and rejected by the Senate.").
88. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, supra note 25, at
§ 570(f)(2).
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not.8 9 They also note that the legislative history shows Con-
gress' intent that the federal law form the core of U.S. relations
with Myanmar,90 and President Clinton has expressed his de-
sire "that the Administration and the Congress speak with one
voice on this issue."9 1 Finally, proponents of the supremacy ar-
gument note that the Burma Law goes beyond the federal legis-
lation 92 by covering subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad and
of foreign companies operating outside the U.S.9 3
Although the Supreme Court has held that there is a pre-
sumption against preemption absent clear preemptive lan-
guage,94  existing Supreme Court authority holds that
preemption of state and local law is presumed in the area of for-
eign policy, due to the federal government's supremacy in the
field.95 For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court
struck down a Pennsylvania statute because it attempted to reg-
ulate immigration, a federal concern already covered by federal
legislation.96 Hines noted the possible repercussions of the stat-
ute and acknowledged that "[olur system of government is such
that the interest of the cities, counties, and states, no less than
the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively re-
quires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations
be left entirely free from local interference." 97 The Court also
stated that "[a]ny concurrent state power that may exist is re-
stricted to the narrowest of limits; the state's power here is not
bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax. '98
The Supreme Court has also applied its foreign policy pre-
emption analysis to state statutes providing remedies for ex-
isting federal law. In Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor
89. See Burma Law, supra note 1, at § 22(G)(a).
90. See Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 473-74 (describing the conflict
between the Burma Law and the intent of Congress); Schmahmann & Finch,
supra note 14, at 186-89 (discussing the Congressional Record).
91. Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 473 (citation omitted).
92. See Exec. Order 13047, § 4(c), 62 Fd. Reg. 28301 (1997).
93. See Burma Law, supra note 1, at § 22(G)(a). An expressio unius argu-
ment is that broad sanctions were not enacted because Congress did not want
them, and therefore the Burma Law should be preempted. See Price &
Hannah, supra note 14, at 474 (stating that the existence of limits on the reach
of the federal sanctions demonstrates that there was a purposeful foreign policy
determination.)
94. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552
(1985).
95. See Price and Hannah, supra note 14, at 476 (discussing the caselaw).
96. 312 U.S. 52, 61-62 (1941).
97. Id. at 63.
98. Id. at 68.
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and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., the Court struck down a
state law that punished violators of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) because the law was too similar to a federal
remedy.99 The Court found that Congress had occupied much of
the field of industrial regulations when it passed the NLRA,
thus preventing states from regulating in the area or creating
judicial remedies for NLRA violations. 100 A notable factor in
this case was the comprehensive nature of the federal legislation
enacted by Congress. 101
Although the preemption arguments against the Burma
Law are powerful, there are legitimate arguments against pre-
emption. In Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of Califor-
nia,10 2 the Supreme Court upheld a state tax apportionment
method even though the federal government's taxation method
differed, 10 3 the Executive Branch opposed it, 104 and foreign
countries protested it.105 The Court declared that Congress may
"passively indicate that state practices do not 'impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."1 06
It then found that because Congress had been aware of the en-
tire situation yet failed to enact legislation spelling out an intent
to preempt the state method, it had tacitly expressed a willing-
ness to tolerate it.10 7
Similarly, in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, the
third circuit upheld a Pennsylvania "buy-American" steel pro-
curement law despite the existence of federal statutes regulat-
99. 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986).
100. See id. at 286.
101. See id. at 290 (recognizing that Congress intended for the legislation to
occupy the field).
102. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
103. See id. at 305 (stating that the federal government employs a "separate
accounting" method, as opposed to the combined reporting method used by
California).
104. See id. at 329 (stating that proposed legislation to outlaw state taxation
practices was not evidence of undue interference with foreign affairs because
the Executive Branch had proposed it, not Congress). Neither was the judiciary
in a position to decide "how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they
please." Id. at 328 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).
105. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 324 n.22 (referring to amicus briefs
filed by the United Kingdom, 11 European Communities member countries, and
the governments of eight other countries in disapproval of California's method).
106. Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 448 (1979)).
107. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 323-24.
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ing foreign commerce.' 08 The act was challenged on the same
three grounds as the Burma Law, and the court found that
rather than preempting state buy-American laws, the federal
law "seems tacitly to acknowledge and permit them."10 9 The
legislative history indicated that Congress was concerned about
achieving reciprocal trade barrier reduction, and therefore it
would not have made sense to infer that it intended to preempt
all existing state trade barriers. 110
Finally, in 1989, Maryland's highest court upheld city ordi-
nances requiring divestment of pension fund holdings in compa-
nies doing business in South Africa."' In Board of Trustees v.
Mayor of Baltimore, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that
the ordinances were not preempted by the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986,112 a federal act which imposed various
economic sanctions on South Africa. 113 The court reasoned that
regulation by the city of Baltimore of its own employees' pension
funds was a matter of traditional local regulation that required
compelling evidence of congressional intent to preempt. 1 4 The
ordinances were upheld when the court found neither an express
nor implied intent to preempt them."l5
B. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Baker court invalidated the Burma Law because it im-
permissibly infringed on the federal government's authority in
the realm of foreign affairs. 1116 The European Union further crit-
icized the law in a brief submitted to the Baker court, arguing
that it invited passage of other similar statutes which, taken to-
108. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 907-08 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
109. Id. at 907.
110. See id.
111. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 756 (Md.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
112. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100
Stat. 1086.
113. See id.
114. See Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 741.
115. See id. at 741-43.
116. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 289
(D. Mass. 1998) (speaking of the Burma Law's impermissible interference with
federal foreign affairs power). See also Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 454
(criticizing the Burma Law and a similar New York statute). The stated faults
were that the laws "seek to establish local foreign policies and target specific
foreign countries" and thereby "usurp the United States federal government's
power over foreign affairs." Id.
[Vol. 8:249264
STATE FOREIGN POLICY
gether, would "aggravate international tensions,"117 and that
the success of such laws could spread to other issues where cor-
porations have a greater interest.11 Finally, the EU expressed
its doubts as to "the ability of the U.S. to honor international
commitments entered into within the framework of the World
Trade Organization." 119
Although not raised by the EU, critics of laws like the
Burma Law have also noted that state and local government of-
ficials could embarrass the federal government or insult or in-
jure foreign countries or their citizens because they "lack the
expertise, information and resources to make sensible public
judgments about complex international relations issues."' 20 In-
deed, the election of state and local officials is normally not
based on their knowledge of foreign affairs, and they are not ac-
countable to the people of the United States for their actions.121
Supporters of such laws, however, have argued that state
and local government officials have no need for "special knowl-
edge" if they merely provide new ideas and alternatives not ad-
dressed by the federal government. State and local laws can
even serve as checks on "ill-conceived or immoral national for-
eign policies." 122 If states overstep their bounds, Congress may
pass federal laws that specifically preempt state and local coun-
terparts. 23 Finally, it is possible that the recent flurry of state
and local action in the realm of foreign affairs is the result of the
melding of national and state interests, rather than an attempt
by states to infringe upon federal power. 124
The underlying controversy thus appears to turn on
whether state governments have any power in foreign relations.
Unfortunately for the states, the weight of authority supports
the federal government's supreme power to regulate foreign af-
fairs. Congress has the authority to "regulate Commerce with
117. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d at 291.
118. See Theo Emery, State With Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1997, at D1 (quoting Georgetown University professor
Robert Stumberg). Stumberg stated that opponents of state and local selective-
purchasing laws are "clearly afraid that if economic sanctions and selective
purchasing laws can be enacted in the case of Burma, sanctions will spread to
other issues, where there are much larger corporate interests at stake." Id.
119. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d at 291.
120. Bilder, supra note 15, at 828.
121. See id. at 827-28.
122. Id. at 829.
123. See id. at 828.
124. See id.
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foreign Nations, and among the several States."125 Additionally,
the States may not "enter into any Treaty,"126 nor enter into any
agreement or compact1 27 with a foreign nation without the con-
sent of Congress. 128 Neither may they lay any imposts or duties
on imports or exports without the consent of Congress. 129 Fi-
nally, although the Tenth Amendment guarantees that the
States retain powers not expressly delegated to the federal gov-
ernment nor denied to them,' 30 case law has tended to support
federal over state authority in the area of foreign affairs.13 '
1. Key Precedent
Although Zschernig v. Miller 132 is the leading case defining
the power of the federal government in foreign affairs, several
other Supreme Court cases leading up to it are relevant to an
analysis of the Burma Law.
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court upheld a
Soviet settlement claim against the United States even though
it ran against New York State's public policy.133 The claim was
part of an agreement negotiated between the federal govern-
ment and the Soviet Union, and the interest of the federal gov-
ernment was deemed superior to state policy.' 3 4 The Court
declared that "complete power over international affairs is in the
national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states."'35
United States v. Pink involved the same agreement, and the
Court reiterated its previously expressed principle that "[p]ower
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
the national government exclusively."1 36
Hines v. Davidowitz137 presents a difficult precedential bar-
rier for the Burma Law. In Hines, the Supreme Court invali-
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
127. The Burma Law is not an "agreement" or "compact"; for discussion of
what does constitute an "agreement" or "compact," see Neret & Valladares,
supra note 15, at 207-08.
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
131. See supra note 94-98 and accompanying text.
132. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
133. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
134. See id. at 330.
135. Id. at 331.
136. 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
137. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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dated Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act which, like the
Burma Law, was enacted just before the federal government
passed legislation dealing with the same subject matter.138 The
Court stated that the federal government "is entrusted with full
and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with for-
eign sovereignties" and that "[o]ur system of government is such
that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than
the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively re-
quires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations
be left entirely free from local interference."1 39
In the face of this negative precedent, the Burma Law's
prospects are brightened by several government procurement
cases. In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District
Water Supply Commission, a state "Buy American" statute was
upheld because it did not necessitate localities assessing the pol-
icies of foreign countries and because it applied to all foreign na-
tions equally.140 Furthermore, in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a different state "Buy Ameri-
can" law was upheld because it gave state administrators no op-
portunity to "comment on, let alone key their decisions to, the
nature of foreign regimes." 141 However, a California "Buy
American" act was held unconstitutional in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Board of Commissioners of the Department of Water &
138. See id.
139. Id. at 63. A number of lower court holdings bear on this issue. In New
York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, New York City's
antidiscrimination laws were held to be unacceptably intrusive upon the foreign
affairs power of the federal government as applied to a newspaper that pub-
lished advertisements for employment in South Africa. 361 N.E.2d 963, 968
(N.Y. 1977). In Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, an Illinois law was
struck down because the state's purpose of encouraging an economic boycott of
the South African Krugerrand was not legitimate. 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986).
But see Andrea L. McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-
Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values Into Foreign Policymaking, 62
TEMP.L. REV. 813, 823-24 (1989) (arguing that the New York Times court failed
to address New York City's citizens' interest in expressing distaste for govern-
ment-sponsored violations of human rights and criticizing the court in Spring-
field for focusing on the potential, rather than actual effect, on foreign
relations). Finally, a state university policy banning admission of Iranian stu-
dents in response to the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis was held unconstitutional
because it constituted an intrusion on the "arenas of foreign affairs and immi-
gration policy, interrelated matters entrusted exclusively to the federal govern-
ment." See Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1376 (D.N.M.
1980).
140. 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
141. 916 F.2d 903, 913 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
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Power of the City of Los Angeles for intruding upon the federal
government's power over foreign affairs. 142
Zschernig v. Miller143 is the leading case defining the power
of the federal government in foreign affairs. Zschernig estab-
lished that a state law may be struck down even where no pre-
emptive federal legislation exists and where the federal
government has expressed support for the law. 144 Decided in
1968 at the height of the Cold War, Zschernig involved an Ore-
gon statute denying inheritance rights to nonresident aliens liv-
ing in countries that did not reciprocate. In striking down the
statute, the Court noted that it was "an intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to
the President and the Congress."145 The Court also expressed
substantial discomfort at the prospect of probate courts scruti-
nizing the policies of foreign countries.' 46 Distinguishing the
case of Clark v. Allen, in which a similar statute was upheld, the
Court noted that the Clark statute would have had only "some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. 1 47 The
Zschernig statute, however, required probate judges to engage
in fairly in-depth analyses of foreign policy, and the Court held
that these inquiries had more than an incidental effect, result-
ing in too much state interference.' 4s
Critics of the Burma Law argue149 that it violates the hold-
ing in Zschernig because it was passed specifically to force the
142. 276 Cal. App.2d 221 (1969).
143. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (stating that "even in the absence of a treaty, a
State's policy may disturb foreign relations").
144. See id. at 434. Justice Stewart recognized that the Executive Branch
had expressed its opinion that the Oregon law did not "unduly interfere" with
the federal government's exercise of the foreign affairs power. See id. at 443
(Stewart, J., concurring). However, he stated in his concurrence that:
that is not the point. We deal here with the basic allocation of power
between the States and the Nation. Resolution of so fundamental a
constitutional issue cannot vary from day to day with the shifting
winds at the State Department.
Today, we are told, Oregon's statute does not conflict with the national
interest. Tomorrow it may.
Id.
145. Id. at 432.
146. See id. at 433-34.
147. 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). In Clark, the California probate law at issue
was similar to the one in Zschernig. On its face, however, the law did not re-
quire probate judges to engage in deep analysis of foreign policy, and therefore
it was deemed to have only an incidental effect on foreign countries. See id.
148. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968).
149. See, e.g., Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 454. Price and Hannah
also read Zschernig to imply that judges should look at the possible "cumulative
effect that a multiplicity of such laws would have on the ability of the federal
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SPDC to change its policies, a matter strictly within the purview
of the federal government. 150 They further contend that the
complaints of the European Communities and Japan constitute
even greater proof of foreign opposition than the single, small
foreign country whose complaint was cited in Zschernig.151
They stress the broad nature of federal foreign policy power 5 2
and allege that local laws, like the Burma Law, interfere with
the ability of the U.S. government to maintain a coherent and
coordinated foreign policy.' 5 3 In Baker, Chief Judge Tauro
seems to agree with this view.' 54
If the Burma Law is to survive, Massachusetts must show
that it is not attempting to invade the federal government's
power and that, like the statute upheld in Clark, its effects are
incidental. Zschernig has not been overruled, but in turn it did
not overrule Clark.155 It is important to note that while the
Constitution does not allow the states to conduct their own for-
eign policy, it does not completely exclude them from the area of
foreign relations. There have been, for example, no major objec-
tions to state and local government-sponsored cultural and edu-
government to conduct a coherent foreign policy." Id. at 458. They note that the
Zschernig statute was struck down even though it involved an area tradition-
ally of state concern (probate), because "those regulations must give way if they
impair the effective exercise of the [niation's foreign policy." Id. (citing
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440). Finally, they argue that the Court provided guide-
lines as to the constitutionality of such measures, providing that laws with
more than an "indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries," and which
would create "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" of the United
States foreign policy, are unconstitutional. Id. at 458 (citing Zschernig 389 U.S.
at 434-35).
150. See Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 462 (citing Zschernig for the
proposition that these are "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to
the Federal Government").
151. See id. at 463 (mentioning the fact that in one instance, application of
the Zschernig statute resulted in a complaint being registered by the small com-
munist country of Bulgaria).
152. See id. at 466-71.
153. See id. at 464 (stating that selective purchasing laws destroy the fed-
eral government's ability to create a coherent foreign policy).
154. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 292 (D.
Mass. 1998). In Baker, Judge Tauro cited Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of
Comm'n, in which a California "Buy American Law" that provided for state con-
struction contracts to be awarded only to companies agreeing to use America-
made products, was held unconstitutional. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 224-26 (1969).
155. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). See also Tiefer, supra note 55,
at 49 (pointing out that Congress has been deferential in "federalism-sensitive
areas like state taxes."). The continuing force and precise applicability of
Zschernig has also been questioned. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 15, at 826 (cit-
ing L. HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 227, 476-77 n.51
(1972)).
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cational exchanges with foreign countries and cities.15 6 Neither
have there been objections to trade or investment solicitation or
to the establishment of foreign offices due to trade or investment
ties. 157
Nevertheless, Massachusetts should seriously consider lim-
iting the existing law to reduce its tendency to necessitate "min-
ute inquiries concerning the actual administration of the foreign
law, [and] the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements."158
These were issues with which the Zschernig Court had serious
problems. Although Zschernig now needs to be read in light of
post-Cold War realities and with an eye toward the opposing
views of Clark, it is still good law and Massachusetts should
treat it as such.
2. Effects of the Burma Law
While the economic effects of the Burma Law are unclear, it
has achieved its goal of making an impression on the interna-
tional community. 159 This impression is evidenced by external
reactions to the law.1 60 Japan and the European Community
have called for a WTO dispute settlement panel and are vocally
opposed to the law,161 while Brigadier General David Abel, My-
anmar's own Minister for National Planning and Economic De-
156. See Bilder, supra note 15, at 826 (listing a number of goodwill activities
engaged in by states and localities with foreign states and localities)
157. See id.
158. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 n.5 (1968).
159. See Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d at 291 (noting legislative history that evi-
dences these goals).
160. Among the companies that have withdrawn from Myanmar are: Apple
Computer, Philips Electronics, Amoco, Columbia Sportswear, Carlsberg, Levi
Strauss, Liz Claiborne, and Spiegel's Eddie Bauer. See Schmahmann & Finch,
supra note 14, at 202 (citation omitted). But see Ted Bunker, Burma Sanctions
Lack Mass Business Appeal, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 24, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7653657 (stating that Johnson & Johnson, Proctor & Gamble, UPS, Federal
Express, and Textron have all maintained ties with Myanmar, as well as for-
eign companies such as BMW, Bridgestone, Honda, Hyundai, JVC, Sony, Nes-
tle, and Toyota). Furthermore, at least one large oil company that recently
pulled out of Myanmar reportedly did not do so because of the Massachusetts
law. See id.
161. See United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement, Re-
quest for Consultations by Japan, supra note 48; United States-Measure Affect-
ing Government Procurement, Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, supra note 49 (discussing the complaints of Japan and the EC
regarding the Burma Law).
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velopment, has stated that the law will have little or no effect on
Myanmar.162
International support for the goals of the Burma Law is
strong and reflects the powerful sentiment that human rights
violations are wrong and intolerable. Britain, Denmark, and
Sweden have criticized Myanmar's human rights violations. 163
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) have in-
dicated their support for the Burma Law as well, noting the hy-
pocrisy of the EU in condemning Myanmar's human rights
violations while simultaneously attempting to force Massachu-
setts to change its law.' 64 The International Federation of
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions recently
wrote to the EU's trade commissioner, arguing that the EU
should withdraw its WTO complaint and cut all trade ties with
Myanmar until democracy has been achieved.' 65 Further,
World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz commented that the
international investment community increasingly prefers to
162. See Myanmar Official Downplays U.S. Business Restrictions, supra
note 22.
163. See Britain Calls for Tougher Action Against Myanmar, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16619584 (recognizing the
possibility that Britain will ban EU transit visas for the SPDC and that
although strongly opposed to the junta, it is reluctant to make a solo stand and
has expressed a desire for other nations to join it in a united front against the
SPDC and its policies). In response, the SPDC published a press release criti-
cizing Britain and stating that the call for sanctions was colonialistic, noting
that Myanmar (then Burma) was a British colony up until 1948. See Myanmar
Steps Up Protest Against British Calls for Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Oct. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16622144. Denmark and Sweden have also
called for tougher sanctions. See Angus MacKinnon, EU Accused of Condoning
"Pariah" Burma with WTO Action, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 21, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 16603807.
164. See MacKinnon, supra note 163 (discussing the Unions' protests).
ICFTU General Secretary Bill Jordan stated that "[ilf the actions of Massachu-
setts, which put the human rights of the Burmese people above the interests of
a few multinational companies, do not comply with WTO rules, then the WTO
rules need changing, not the actions of Massachusetts." Id. Also of interest,
despite Japan's participation in the WTO challenge, its own foreign minister,
Masahiko Komura, has reportedly told U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Al-
bright that Tokyo will not be giving aid to Myanmar in the near future. My-
anmar Junta Holds Mass Anti-NLD Rally, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Sept. 30,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16609661.
165. See Michael S. Lelyveld, EU Urged to End Crusade Against Massachu-
setts Law: Union Group Seeks Help on Myanmar Sanctions, J. COM., Oct. 19,
1998, at 3A.
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avoid investing in countries that engage in undemocratic
actions. 166
3. The Sullivan Principles
Numerous commentators have argued that sanctions such
as those imposed by the Burma Law and the Omnibus Act will
simply not work and that, instead of cutting economic ties, the
United States should encourage foreign investment in offending
countries in order to exert more control over their govern-
ments. 167 This approach was articulated in the "Sullivan Princi-
ples," a code of conduct put together as part of the effort to end
apartheid in South Africa. 168 As under the "Sullivan Princi-
ples," foreign companies doing business in a country such as My-
anmar would agree to abide by a voluntary code of conduct and
their behavior would be monitored by an independent consulting
company. The continued participation of the companies would
provide both stability and a model for the troubled nation. 169
Business groups insist that sanctions will fail and will re-
sult "[iin the surrender of the Burmese market to international
competitors."' 70 Instead, they argue that a human rights ana-
logue to the Sullivan Principles should be adopted, rather than
allowing states and localities to take matters into their own leg-
islative hands. Unfortunately, the previous application of the
Sullivan Principles largely failed, the founder himself later ad-
mitting that they had not been effective. 171 It follows that leav-
ing Burmese human rights to business people and corporations,
pursuant to a program like the Sullivan Principles, would not
work. As National League for Democracy leader Suu Kyi recog-
166. Investors, Stay Clear of Regimes Like Burma, WORLDSOURCES, INC.,
Sept. 28, 1998, available in LEXIS, Emerging Markets Datafile.
167. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 46, at 14.
168. See id. at 14 n.8 (discussing the Sullivan Principles which are a set of
principles constructed by Leon Sullivan, a Philadelphia minister and board
member of General Motors and other corporations, for American companies to
adopt rather than going to the extreme of ending all investment in South
Africa).
169. See id.
170. Citing Deepening Political Repression, U.S. Bans All New Investment in
Myanmar, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Apr. 23, 1997 (referring to a statement
made by National Association of Manufacturers President Jerry Jasinowski).
171. See Berat, supra note 27, at 19-23 (explaining that Sullivan became
disillusioned with how the Principles were followed, and eventually asked com-
panies to withdraw from South Africa completely). The problem was that the
companies agreeing to honor the Principles tended to either fail or nearly fail
compliance tests, or actually drop out of the program altogether. In general,
little progress was made and few facilities were desegregated. See id.
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nizes, economic development would be inadequate because in-
vestors in Burma would discover that the expected profits
cannot be realized, and they would most likely not be interested
in exerting moral leverage without monetary profit. 172 Simply
put, human rights are not a priority for corporations and entities
interested in foreign investment.
C. FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT
EXCEPTION
In Baker, Judge Tauro declined to base his ruling on the
Foreign Commerce Clause, perhaps because he viewed interfer-
ence with the federal foreign relations power as a stronger
claim. 173 However, it was argued that the Burma Law could be
struck down as a violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Thus Massachusetts must be prepared to defend against this
claim on appeal.
1. The Foreign Commerce Clause
As stated previously, the Constitution grants to Congress
the sole power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States. 17 4 Furthermore, the states need
Congressional approval to make treaties, agreements, or com-
pacts 175 and to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports.176
Accordingly, if selective purchasing laws unduly affect interna-
tional trade in order to achieve their purposes, they are uncon-
stitutional because they impermissibly interfere with Congress'
authority to regulate foreign commerce. 177 To go one step fur-
ther, opponents of the Burma Law argue that even without con-
172. Interview by Dominic Faulder with Aung San Suu Kyi Dominic
Faulder, Nobel Peace Laureate (Apr. 17, 1996), available at <http://
www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek 96/0503/ nat6.html>(last visited Feb. 8, 1999).
Kyi also stated that "[nio business that wishes to exert moral leverage would be
engaged in Burma under the present circumstances." Id.
173. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 293
(D. Mass. 1998) (stating that the decision rests on foreign relations rather than
on Foreign Commerce Clause grounds).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3. The Burma Law is not an "agree-
ment" or "compact"; for discussion of what does constitute one, see Neret & Val-
ladares, supra note 15, at 207-08.
176. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
177. See, e.g., Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 455(making this argu-
ment). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (stating that
the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent the economic Balkanization that
was so problematic first among the colonies, and then among the states under
the Articles of Confederation).
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trary federal legislation, the Burma Law would violate the
"dormant" Commerce Clause because of its undue burdens on
interstate commerce and attempts to regulate foreign
commerce.178
The leading case involving state legislation and the Foreign
Commerce Clause is Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
les.179 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down California's
facially neutral ad valorem tax as applied to Japanese shipping
containers used in foreign trade, 8 0 stating that "the Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments.' 18 The Court re-
viewed California's tax under strict scrutiny and struck it down
because of the "acute" risks of interfering with federal uniform-
ity and provoking Japanese retaliation, which would be felt by
the United States.' 8 2 The Court further indicated that scrutiny
is heightened when the Foreign, rather than Interstate Com-
merce Clause, is implicated.' 8 3
Under strict scrutiny, the Burma Law is vulnerable, but not
hopelessly so. Massachusetts may support its position by point-
ing to the moderate judicial shift toward protection of state and
local acts affecting foreign commerce. In Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, the Supreme Court, in 1926, struck down a state stat-
ute requiring international ticket brokers to obtain a license,
show proof of good character and fitness to conduct such busi-
ness, pay an annual fee, and post a security bond against fraud
and misrepresentation to purchasers. 184 The principles set forth
178. See, e.g., Camps Newfound-Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 580-81 (1997)(discussing activities that violate the dormant com-
merce clause).
179. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
180. See id.
181. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976)). The Court also stated that "'[in international relations and with re-
spect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act
through a single government with unified and adequate national power.'" Id. at
448 (quoting Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59
(1933)).
182. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
183. See id. at 446. See also South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (stating the rule that state restrictions on foreign commerce
are subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than federal restrictions).
184. 273 U.S. 34 (1926). The statute in Di Santo was found to unduly bur-
den foreign commerce. See id. at 37.
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in the dissenting opinions, which would have upheld the statute,
were later adopted by the Court.18 5
The dissent of Justice Brandeis found that Pennsylvania
was not attempting to regulate foreign commerce because the
purchase of international tickets was an intrastate transaction.
Justice Brandeis also noted that the legislation attempted to
combat a state concern-namely, the fraud and misrepresenta-
tion in the state that primarily affected poor immigrants.' 8 6 Be-
cause Pennsylvania did not obstruct, discriminate against, or
directly burden foreign commerce, Justice Brandeis found the
statute was constitutional.18 7
There is also evidence of a shift toward protection of state
and local laws affecting foreign relations in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board.l 8 California's method of ap-
portioning its franchise tax for multinational corporations was
upheld against charges that it unduly burdened foreign com-
merce. The Court upheld the statute because it was fair and
therefore posed little risk of foreign retaliation. 8 9 Two notable
lower court holdings are also consistent with the shift. In 1989,
Maryland's Court of Appeals held in Board of Trustees v. City of
Baltimore that a state anti-apartheid ordinance did not unduly
burden interstate commerce because of its minimal effects on
South Africa and the legitimate local interests of Baltimore in
divesting its money.' 90 Additionally, in 1990 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Penn-
sylvania.19 1 The Trojan Court extended the market participant
exception to cover states disfavoring foreign suppliers, 192 up-
holding Pennsylvania's "Buy American" law because it gave
185. See, e.g., California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941) (recognizing
that the principles of Di Santo's dissenting opinions were approved by the
Court in subsequent cases).
186. Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37-39 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 41 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
188. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
189. See id. at 194. The Court stated that the law had "merely foreign
resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs," and the risk of retaliation
was viewed as "attenuated at best." Id. at 195.
190. 562 A.2d 720, 753 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (find-
ing the effect on South Africa to be negligible and finding the market partici-
pant exception applicable). See also Andrea McArdle, supra note 139, at 829-30
(arguing that Baltimore narrows the application of Zschernig by focusing on the
actual impact on a foreign government or its citizens). But see Price & Hannah,
supra note 14, at 490-98 (arguing that the Maryland court was in error).
191. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d
903, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
192. See id. at 912.
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state administrators no opportunity to "comment on, let alone
key their decisions to, the nature of foreign regimes.1 93
Four years after Trojan, the Supreme Court decided the
case of Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California.19 4
The same apportionment method previously challenged in
Container Corp. was again upheld, this time as applied to world-
wide operations of foreign multinational corporations con-
ducting business in California.1 9 5  Significantly, this
apportionment method differed from that of the federal govern-
ment.19 6 It is also noteworthy that the Executive Branch 197 and
foreign countries both opposed the California law. 198 Despite
these facts, the Court nevertheless found that the apportion-
ment method did not impair the federal government from
"speaking with one voice" in international trade.'9 9 The Court
reasoned that Congress may "passively indicate that state prac-
tices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential."' 200 After finding that Congress was
aware of the displeasure of foreign governments with Califor-
nia's methods and had enacted none of the bills introduced to
prohibit the method, the Court deemed Congress' failure to spell
out its intent to supercede California's method a tacit expression
of its willingness to tolerate it.201 In fact, the Court noted that
opponents of the tax had warned of the risk of foreign retaliation
and referred to warnings issued by foreign countries to support
their case. 20 2 Neither this nor the Executive Branch's opposi-
tion, however, were given much deference. 20 3
193. Id. at 913.
194. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
195. See id. at 330-31.
196. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (stating that the federal
government employs a "separate accounting" method, as opposed to the com-
bined reporting method used by California).
197. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that the Execu-
tive Branch's proposed legislation to outlaw state taxation practices was not
evidence of undue interference with foreign affairs, and that the judiciary was
also ill-equipped to balance the risk of retaliation against the sovereign rights of
states).
198. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (referring to amicus briefs
filed by the United Kingdom, 11 European Communities member countries, and
the governments of eight other countries in disapproval of California's method).
199. Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 327.
200. Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 448 (1979)).
201. See id. at 323-24.
202. See id. at 328 n.30 and accompanying text.
203. See id. at 328-29.
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These cases suggest that the Court has become slightly
more lenient in its Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence, at
least with regard to state taxation. One possible reason is that
all-out war is not an obvious and imminent risk today, whereas
it was a major concern when Japan Line was decided.204 Addi-
tionally, there is less reason to anticipate harsh economic retali-
ation because the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
limits use of retaliatory measures. 20 5 The Burma Law, however,
is still on treacherous ground because of its facial discrimination
against Myanmar. Accordingly, the Burma Law's best defense is
the market participant exception.
2. Market Participant Exception
Even if certain provisions of the Burma Law technically vio-
late the Foreign Commerce Clause, the market participant ex-
ception could prevent its invalidation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that if a state or locality
is acting as a market participant rather than as a market regu-
lator, it may impose regulations that might otherwise violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., for example, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland's right
as a market participant to make it more difficult for out-of-state
scrap companies to collect money paid by the state to those who
demolished abandoned cars.206 The burden on scrap processors
was permissible because Maryland entered the scrap market as
a purchaser of demolished automobiles, not as a regulator, and
could therefore exercise "the right to favor its own citizens over
others."207
In an analogous case, Reeves v. Stake, the Supreme Court
allowed South Dakota to restrict the sale of state-produced ce-
ment to out-of-state buyers because it had a legitimate purpose
to act in a protectionist manner. 208 The Court recognized that
as a sovereign, a state has the long-held right to engage in "an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
204. See Tiefer, supra note 55, at 73 (stating that with regard to trade, "for-
eign retaliation is not a matter of catastrophic war or peace.").
205. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Nego-
tiations, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, arts. 2(1) & 4(2), Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 112, 128-29 (1994).
[hereinafter Understanding on Dispute Settlement].
206. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
207. Id. at 810.
208. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."20 9 In Reeves,
however, the Court did note that it was not deciding whether the
same analysis applied to the Foreign Commerce Clause. 210
Finally, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., the Court acknowledged the market participant
exception when the mayor of Boston ordered that at least half of
the workers hired by city construction project contractors be
Boston residents. 211 Because the city used its own funds on the
projects, the Court found that it was operating as a market par-
ticipant.212 The Court did, however, state that "there are some
limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restric-
tions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the
government transacts business."213
Four years after White, the Court invalidated an Alaska
statute because it did reach beyond the immediate parties. In
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, the Court held that
Alaska was not acting as a market participant when it required
all timber sold from state-owned land to be processed within the
state.214 The Court refused to immunize Alaska through the
market participant exception because it was imposing conditions
"downstream," regulating the purchaser's dealings with third
parties after the sale was complete. 215
Critics of the Burma Law argue that Massachusetts should
not be able to invoke the market participant exception for three
main reasons. First, Congress has passed legislation, and the
market participant exception applies only in the absence of Con-
gressional action.216 Second, the Supreme Court has indicated
that the market participant exception does not apply when for-
eign commerce is involved. 217 Third, the law exceeds the limited
exception that Congress contemplated. 218
209. Id. at 439 (1980). The Court stated that although state action could
raise issues which are "subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to as-
sess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis," the proper way to deal with
it is to allow Congress to resolve the matter in a democratic manner. Id.
210. See id. at 437 n.9.
211. 460 U.S. 204, 214 (1983).
212. See id. at 214-15.
213. Id. at 211 n.7.
214. 467 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1984).
215. Id.
216. Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14, at 192.
217. See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 95-96 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 438 U.S.
429, 437-38 n.9 (1980) (indicating that the exception does not apply because of
the heightened scrutiny used in foreign commerce cases)).
218. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14, at 192.
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With regard to the first two arguments, Massachusetts has
a good defense based on Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore,
in which the market participant exception was held applicable
to a Baltimore anti-apartheid divestment ordinance despite the
existence of similar federal legislation 219 and despite its effect
on foreign commerce. 220 The third argument, however, presents
a greater obstacle for the Burma Law. Massachussets' best re-
joinder is that the Burma Law lacks the blatant protectionist
nature of the Wunnicke statute. 221 Instead of seeking to pro-
mote the economic interests of its own citizens, the Burma Law
seeks to promote human rights.
An additional boost to the Burma Law may come from the
theoretical First Amendment rights of the states.222 Massachu-
setts could assert that the First Amendment protects the right of
states to express their views on federal action through state or
local legislation, as well as to associate with the businesses of
their choice, because the "purpose and spirit" of the First
Amendment covers these rights.223 Indeed, giving the states
some authority in foreign affairs will enable people to come
closer to their own government and actively participate in it,
which may in turn spur the federal government to become more
accountable to the people it represents. 224 Despite the absence
of precedential support for this argument, there is always the
possibility that an appellate court will give some deference to
the expressive rights of states and localities. 225
219. 562 A.2d 720, 741-43 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990)
(discussing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and concluding that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt the Ordinance).
220. Id. at 749. But see Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 490-98 (arguing
that the Maryland court was in error). Furthermore, the Third Circuit has held
the market participant exception applicable to a case involving the Foreign
Commerce Clause. See Trojan Technologies v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
916 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
221. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100
(1984).
222. See generally McArdle, supra note 139 (discussing First Amendment
rights of state and local governments).
223. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 15, at 827. The author asserts that these
rights "fall within the purpose and spirit of these [First Amendment] fumda-
mental rights and the courts are likely to find a basis for extending them some
protection." Id.
224. See Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, 81 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995,
at 76, 78-79.
225. See McArdle, supra note 139, at 833-39 (discussing how state and local
governments could act as vehicles for citizen input into foreign affairs).
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III. HOPE FOR THE BURMA LAW
The Baker decision was clearly an important statement
about the constitutionality of state selective purchasing laws in
the foreign relations context. Despite the opposition the Burma
Law faces on appeal, there is still hope for the its survival based
upon the following arguments.
A. THE PREEMPTION CHALLENGE
In Baker, Judge Tauro declined to hear oral arguments on
the issue of preemption 226 because he did not believe the NFTC
met the preemption doctrine's required burden of proof.22 7 Pre-
emption may be the weakest of the three arguments against the
Burma Law, but even here the law faces a difficult struggle. In
light of the presumption of federal preemption in foreign affairs,
the following arguments represent Massachusetts' best chance
at prevailing on this issue.
Massachusetts should argue that the Burma Law has not
been expressly preempted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appro-
priations Act. The federal act was passed after the Burma Law
was enacted. 228 Thus, Congress could have passed preemptive
legislation had it felt the Burma Law threatened its foreign af-
fairs power. Furthermore, White House sources have reportedly
stated that the Clinton administration does not want to confront
the states in this context.229 Additionally, compliance with both
the Burma Law and the federal law is possible.230 The Baker
court was quick to note the absence of "actual conflict" between
the two laws,23 1 and while critics charge that Congress "ex-
pressly considered and rejected" the approach taken by the
Burma Law,23 2 both laws aim to foster human rights improve-
226. Lelyveld, supra note 76, at 3A.
227. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 293 (D.
Mass. 1998).
228. See Burma Law, supra note 1; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997, supra note 25.
229. See Altbach, supra note 63 (referring to White House sources). See also
Iritani, supra note 62, at D1.
230. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing preemption
where laws are so inconsistent with federal law that compliance with both is
impossible).
231. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d, at 293 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117, 131 (1978), for the proposition that there must be actual
rather than speculative conflict).
232. Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 14, at 189 (stating that laws like
Massachusetts' attempt "through local action a strategy expressly considered
and rejected by the Senate").
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ments in Myanmar. The federal legislation is more limited in
scope because it exempts contracts for goods, services, or tech-
nology,233 but the two laws are not mutually exclusive.
The most daunting opposition to the Burma Law is the
traditional assumption of federal preemption in the realm of for-
eign relations. The weight of precedent, evident in the previ-
ously discussed cases of Hines23 4 and Gould,2 35 supports this
assumption. Hines, for example, stated that the federal govern-
ment "is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the
conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties," and that "[o]ur
system of government is such that the interest of the cities,
counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the
whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference." 236
In both Barclay's Bank237 and Trojan Technologies,238 state
laws involving foreign nations were upheld against preemption
challenges when Congress' failure to enact clear preemptive leg-
islation was deemed to be tacit approval of the relevant state
law.2 39 Given these cases, Massachusetts should argue that be-
cause Congress could have preempted the Burma Law but chose
not to, it tacitly approved of the law. Furthermore, in Board of
Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Maryland high court upheld
city ordinances which required divestment of employee pension
funds from businesses in South Africa in spite of federal legisla-
tion that was titled "comprehensive. '240 Control of city funds
was deemed a matter of state concern such that a clear state-
ment of congressional intent to preempt was necessary. 241
233. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, supra note 25,
§ 570(f)(2).
234. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See also supra notes 96-98
and accompanying text.
235. See Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986). See also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
236. Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
237. See Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298,
323-24 (1994).
238. See Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, at 907-11
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
239. Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 323-24; Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at
907.
240. See supra notes 111-15 (discussing the ordinances which were upheld
despite the existence of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986).
241. See supra notes 112-15 (discussing the requirement of clear intent and
the fact that there was no finding of intent in the case).
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B. STATE FOREIGN POLICY
The Baker decision, which rested on the issue of state inter-
ference with federal foreign policy,242 will be difficult to overturn
on appeal. United States v. Belmont243, Zschernig v. Miller244,
and Hines v. Davidowitz245 provide a powerful backbone for
supreme federal authority in foreign affairs. Additional charges
that the Burma Law violates the Agreement on Government
Procurement and conflicts with the U.S. government's WTO ob-
ligations add to the case against the Burma Law. 246 Moreover,
opponents argue that state and local officials are not sufficiently
knowledgeable to participate in foreign affairs. 247
In response to these attacks, Massachusetts must deflect
the idea that it is a rogue state attempting to intrude upon the
federal government's authority. This can be accomplished by fo-
cusing on the parallel goals of the Burma Law and the federal
legislation, as well as by arguing that rather than attempting to
infringe upon federal foreign relations authority, Massachusetts
is simply attempting to control how it spends its own state
dollars.
Massachusetts should begin its argument against federal
control of foreign relations by pointing to Clark.2 48 The statute
at issue in Clark did not require probate judges to inquire deeply
into foreign policy and was therefore deemed to have only an
"incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."249 Similarly,
the Burma Law does not require continuing judicial investiga-
tion or assessment of a foreign government. Rather, it requires
a statement as to whether an individual or business does busi-
ness with, or in, Myanmar.2 50 The statement of a Myanmar offi-
cial that the law will have little effect on Myanmar 251
242. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287, 289
(D. Mass. 1998).
243. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
244. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
245. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
246. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the com-
plaints of Japan and the EU regarding the Burma Law).
247. See Bilder, supra note 15, at 828.
248. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
249. Id. at 517.
250. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the statement re-
quired to be given by businesses or individuals seeking a contract with
Massachusetts).
251. See, e.g., Myanmar Official Downplays U.S. Business Restrictions,
supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing a statement by Myanmar's
minister for national planning and economic development) The minister stated
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corroborates the claim that the Burma Law's effects are inciden-
tal. Furthermore, the promise of U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky that Washington will defend the Burma
law because "[t]he practical commercial effect of this type of leg-
islation on Europe is nil,"252 bolsters this claim.
Although Japan and the European Union's contention that
the Burma Law violates the AGP is damaging, the law's sponsor
has stated that he would be willing to amend it if the EU will
impose new sanctions on Myanmar. 253 In line with this state-
ment, Massachusetts officials have met with U.S. officials in an
attempt to "craft legislation that takes into account U.S. inter-
national obligations." 254 Possible changes to the law could allow
Massachusetts to express its disapproval of the SPDC's human
rights violations, while preventing the law from having more
than an "incidental" effect on foreign relations and foreign
trade.255 Yet even without any amendments, the current ver-
sion of the Burma Law does not pose a serious risk of foreign
retaliation. The Court in Zschernig and those in other leading
cases in the area were noticeably concerned with the possibility
of military retaliation by foreign nations.256 Such concerns are
greatly reduced today.
The tacit approval argument against preemption can also be
used to support the Burma Law in the face of federal supremacy
over foreign relations. Under Barclay's Bank257 and Trojan
that selective purchasing laws "will only hurt the United States companies but
will not affect Myanmar much." Id.
252. See Altbach, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
253. See Greenberger, supra note 61 and accompanying text (recognizing
that Massachusetts Representative Byron Rushing did not know about the
WTO AGP at the time he pushed the Burma Law through the state legislature
but would move to amend it if the EU would impose new sanctions on
Myanmar).
254. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (referring to a letter written
by U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky to Sir Leon Brittan, vice-
president of the EC).
255. Assuming the truth of Myanmar's minister for national planning and
economic development's statement that selective purchasing laws "will only
hurt the United States companies but will not affect Myanmar much." My-
anmar Official Downplays U.S. Business Restrictions, supra note 22.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (recogniz-
ing the risk of conflict within foreign nations); See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (recognizing the risk of one state's actions, intentional or
unintentional, leading to war with foreign nations that would affect the United
States as a whole). Accord Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
257. Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 323-
24 (1994).
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Technologies,258 state laws involving foreign nations may be up-
held if Congress had the chance to enact clear preemptive legis-
lation, but chose not to. Congressional inaction can be deemed
an implied approval of the relevant state law.2 59 Accordingly,
Massachusetts can argue that despite the presumption that
states must steer clear of foreign affairs, Congress obviously did
not consider the Burma Law a threat to its foreign affairs au-
thority. If it had, Congress would have preempted the Burma
Law.
Massachusetts should additionally argue that "foreign af-
fairs" should not be construed so broadly as to curtail a state's
right to demonstrate how its citizens feel. The Burma Law can
be viewed not as an attempt to regulate foreign affairs, but as a
way to critique the SPDC's behavior by refusing to spend Massa-
chusetts' taxpayer money in any way that would support that
regime. A democracy such as the U.S. has neither a reason nor a
right to prohibit its local governments from making their opin-
ions and values known to the world. Therefore, this should es-
pecially be true when a state expresses its disapproval by
refusing to spend its own tax dollars to conduct business with
those who participate in what is deemed wrong. Finally, if the
NLD was the rightful victor of the 1990 multiparty elections, 260
it is wrong to strike down sanctions promoting the democracy
that the NLD endorses. The NLD supports sanctions against
Myanmar, and the wishes of the rightful ruling party should be
recognized.
C. THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE MARKET
PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
Defending the Burma Law against charges of a Commerce
Clause violation will be difficult, both because of the law's
facially discriminatory nature and because it affects a field tra-
ditionally dominated by the federal government. Massachu-
setts, however, does have viable arguments that the Burma Law
escapes Commerce Clause invalidation. First, it does not actu-
ally conflict with the federal legislation. Second, and most im-
portant, is the fact that any burden the Burma Law may place
258. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 907-11 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
259. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 323-24; Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d
at 907.
260. See Myanmar Raps "Interference" in Democracy Issues, supra note 12
and accompanying text (referring to the unrecognized election of the NLD in
1990).
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on foreign trade is acceptable because the law falls within the
established market participant exception. 261
1. Acceptable Incidental State Burdens on Foreign Commerce
The leading Foreign Commerce Clause case, Japan Line,
was based on the desire for national uniformity and the risk of
retaliation by foreign entities when a state law unduly burdens
foreign commerce. 262 Japan Line stressed the importance of the
federal government speaking "with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments."263 The Court
struck down the tax in Japan Line because it believed the tax
risked provoking Japanese retaliation. 264 Two previously dis-
cussed cases lend support to the validity of the Burma Law in
the realm of foreign commerce. The Supreme Court has shown a
willingness to uphold state laws that are not protectionist and
marginally affect foreign commerce. For example, the tax appor-
tionment method upheld in Container Corp.2 65 and Barclay's
Bank266 survived because it was fair and therefore posed little
risk of foreign retaliation. 267 The cases make sense if one as-
sumes that if a law is fair, there should be a smaller risk of re-
taliation by a foreign nation. Further, when the federal
government has declined to preempt a state law dealing with
foreign relations, there is little reason to believe that the federal
government fears that the state law interferes with foreign
commerce.
Accordingly, Massachusetts should argue that the Burma
Law is fair because it was not passed in a protectionist attempt
to favor the citizens of Massachusetts. Instead of seeking to pro-
mote the economic interests of Massachusetts, the law strives to
promote human rights. Furthermore, the Burma Law does not
attempt to regulate "downstream" activities.268 Rather, the
Burma Law requires that companies and individuals refuse to
261. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983).
262. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
263. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976)).
264. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
265. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159
(1983). See also supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
266. Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
See also supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
267. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
268. See South-Central Timber Dev't, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100
(1984) (recognizing the protectionist nature of the statute).
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support human rights violations if they wish to do business with
Massachusetts. Once a sale or transaction has occurred, the
company or individual is not hampered with "downstream" re-
quirements imposed by Massachusetts and may even enter into
business transactions with, or in, Myanmar without affecting
the prior sale. Only the future ability of the individual or com-
pany to deal with Massachusetts is at stake.
Finally, human rights violations are a universal concern
and defending them should not be termed "protectionist." Given
the Burma Law's marginal effect on trade with the nation of My-
anmar, the law's laudable goal of protecting human rights mili-
tates in favor of legitimacy.
2. The Market Participant Exception
Even if Foreign Commerce Clause analysis is not precluded,
Massachusetts has a good argument that the Burma Law should
be upheld because it involves a state acting in its role as a mar-
ket participant. The Supreme Court has recognized that if a
state or locality is acting as a market participant, it may, as long
as there is a legitimate purpose for any discrimination in favor
of the state's own citizens, impose requirements on those with
whom it does business even though such impositions would
otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause269
As previously stated, critics argue that the market partici-
pant exception does not apply to the Burma Law because: 1)
there is federal legislation and the exception only applies in the
absence of it; 2) the Supreme Court has indicated that the mar-
ket participation exception does not apply when foreign com-
merce is involved due to the higher scrutiny applied in those
cases; and 3) the law reaches too far by affecting the conduct of
third parties. 270
The first two arguments may fail given Board of Trustees v.
City of Baltimore's extension of the market participant exception
to an anti-apartheid divestment ordinance even though similar
federal legislation existed and foreign commerce was in-
volved.27 ' Those arguments are further weakened by the hold-
269. See, supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text (discussing Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp.). See also supra note 208-10 (discussing Reeves v.
Stake, in which the Court further acknowledged the right of states to conduct
private business and decide with which parties they will deal).
270. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983) (stating that the exception should not extend to
laws that reach beyond the immediate parties involved in the transaction).
271. 562 A.2d 720, 741-43 (Md. 1983).
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ing in Trojan Technologies, which precluded foreign commerce
clause analysis in the case of a state "Buy American" statute.27
2
The Burma Law also does not attempt to regulate "down-
stream" activities. As previously discussed, the Burma Law re-
quires up front that companies and individuals refuse to support
human rights violations in order to initiate a business relation-
ship with Massachusetts.2 7 3 In addition, like "Buy American"
statutes, the Burma Law involves a state decision as to how it
will spend its own funds. The Burma Law is not protectionist
because it aims to promote human rights rather than further
the economic interests of its own citizens. For these reasons,
Massachusetts has a credible argument that the Burma Law
should be upheld as falling within the market participant
exception.
CONCLUSION
The Burma law attempts to communicate to the world, and
to Myanmar in particular, the feeling of Massachusetts' citizens
that human rights violations and the tyrannical methods of the
SPDC are wrong. Massachusetts has chosen to express this sen-
timent by refusing to spend its own money in support of a mili-
tary junta and its associates. There is no better way to express
distaste for a nation's policies than to withdraw every conceiva-
ble form of support. In doing this, Massachusetts has upset
companies who earn their profits by investing in Myanmar or do
business with those who do.
The Burma Law has not been expressly preempted, and
there is a credible argument that Congress has tacitly approved
of its existence. While its interference with the federal foreign
affairs power is the biggest obstacle to the Burma Law's legiti-
macy, it has a moral undertone rather than a protectionist one.
Finally, Massachusetts is acting as a market participant. For
these reasons, the Burma Law has a chance of being upheld by
an appellate court.
Americans have always valued freedom of expression, which
in this case is clearly at odds with the historic exclusion of the
States from speaking in the area of foreign affairs. State anti-
apartheid divestment and selective purchasing laws have ex-
isted for years, but the federal government's need to conduct for-
eign policy in a uniform manner must also be recognized and
272. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 912 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
273. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22H(c ) (1996).
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respected. It is not easy to show disapproval in a way that will
have an impact without any harmful effects. In this case, some
companies will be harmed. That harm, however, is strictly eco-
nomic and pales alongside the greater harm perpetrated by the
SPDC, which includes using human beings as slaves, prosti-
tutes, and mine-sweepers.
Those most opposed to the Burma Law are companies un-
willing to sacrifice profits for human rights. While the Burma
Law and similar statutes may require businesses to scrutinize
their international relationships, the human lives at stake make
it hard to sympathize with them. Voluntary intervention on the
part of huge companies will not work, as the failure of the Sulli-
van Principles demonstrated. Perhaps we should listen to those,
like Aung San Suu Kyi, who know the situation best and still
support sanctions against Myanmar, their own country. In the
end, laws like the Burma Law will not go away. As long as
human rights violations occur, these laws will be passed, and
the debate over their constitutionality will continue.
